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WITNESSES - COMPETENCE AND
CREDIBILITY
By His

HONOUR JUDGE R. DELISLE*

A. INTRODUCTION
It is obvious from the recent efforts undertaken in all common law
countries that reform of the law of evidence is necessary. The beauty of the
common law, fashioned by judges piecemeal to cope with particular problems which arise under varying societal conditions, can become grotesque if
the judiciary abdicates its responsibility for change. 1 Too strict an adherence
to precedent can perpetuate rules of evidence which have outlived their
meaning. Created singly and appropriately to the facts of a particular case,
the rules and exceptions have become so numerous that many have given up
trying to know and understand them all. In the United States, the reformers
have long sought to bring order to the law of evidence by the codification
and restatement of the rules in terms of their purposes. In other jurisdictions
the attempt at reform has been by amendment to particular statutory provisions and codification of some common law rules which seek detailed solutions to particular problems. The Proposed Code of the Law Reform Commission of Canada2 and the Draft Act recommended by the Ontario Law
Reform Commission3 are examples of these two schools of thought. The
codification approach of the Law Reform Commission of Canada seeks to
gather into one document all the rules of evidence and to deny any future
control to the existing common law. The Proposed Federal Code seems to be
based on the premise that it is best to openly give discretion to the trial judge
in each case to determine the admissibility of evidence depending on his view
of the probative force, time requirements and considerations of fairness to
the parties and witnesses. The Ontario Law Reform Commission, however,
is concerned that such an approach might yield a lack of uniformity and
result in confusion. The Commission therefore recommends, where it is able,
detailed and definite provisions to govern admissibility, while in other areas
it is content that the rules fashioned for particular situations by the common
law are satisfactory guidance for the future. It is difficult, if not impossible, to
debate the relative merits of the two approaches. It is suggested, however,
that a great deal of judicial discretion already exists under the surface of the
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2 Report on the Law of Evidence (Toronto: Ontario Law Reform
1976).
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present apparently certain rules and that there is more certainty in the Proposed Federal Code than is recognized by the Ontario position.
B. SPOUSES AS WITNESSES
1.

Existing Law

At common law a party's spouse was incompetent as a witness for or
against the other spouse. The only clear exception 4 to this rule was in criminal cases involving personal violence by the accused against his spouse
wherein the spouse was both competent and compellable.5 In civil cases this
incompetency has now been abolished by statute and spouses are made competent and compellable0 with one minor exception. 7 In criminal cases the
spouse is made a competent witness for the defence in all cases, and with
respect to certain enumerated offences only is made a competent and compellable witness for the prosecution. 8 Despite inconsistent terminology in section 4 of the Canada Evidence Act,9 it does appear plain that competent in
section 4(1) includes the concept of compellability.
In Gosselin v. The King' ° the Supreme Court of Canada interpreted
competent in section 4 of the CanadaEvidence Act, 1893, as including compellable and ruled that the accused's wife could be compelled by the prosecution to give evidence against her husband charged with murder. The wife
in that case clearly did not want to testify. The defence had maintained in
the Supreme Court that the wife "was not a competent witness for the prosecution, that she was not a compellable though a competent witness for the
prisoner . . ."11 Section 4 at that time did not have the phrase "for the
defence" appearing after the word "competent"; that phrase was inserted
after the Gosselin decision in 1906. The Supreme Court in Gosselin specifically refused to read in the words "for the defence," which appeared in the
counterpart Imperial statute, and held that competent meant compellable.
Therefore, competent in the existing section 4(1) must mean competent and

4 See Rupert Cross, Evidence (3rd ed. London: Butterworths, 1967) at 142.

5 Compare R. v. Lapworth, [1931] 1 K.B. 117; R. v. Lonsdale, [1947] 2 W.W.R.
157; 24 C.R.N.S. 225; 15 C.C.C.(2d) 201; and R. v. Ream (1974), 19 C.C.C. (2d)
41. But see R. v. Carter (1970), 73 W.W.R. 491; 11 C.R.N.S. 118; [1970] 5 C.C.C.
155. For contrasting views of the breadth of the nature of the crime necessary to qualify
for this exceptional treatment, compare R. v. Bowles (1967), 60 W.W.R. 276; 50 C.R.
353; [1967] 3 C.C.C. 61; and R. v. Comiskey (1973), 12 C.C.C. (2d) 410.
6See, for example, The Evidence Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 151, s. 8.
7
Id., s. 10.
8
CanadaEvidence Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 307, s. 4.
9 Section 4(2) of the Canada Evidence Act, id., speaks of a spouse being "a competent and compellable witness for the prosecution without the consent of the person
charged." If competent in a statute means competent and compellable, then why use
both words? If the witness is competent and compellable for the prosecution then there
is certainly no need to further provide that that is the case "without the consent of the
person charged."
10 (1903), 33 S.C.R. 255; 7 C.C.C. 139.
11Id. at 279 (S.C.R.); 155 (C.C.C.) per Mills J.
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compellable for the defence. 12 The spouse then, by section 4(1), is a competent and compellable witness for the defence and remains incompetent for the
prosecution except as set out later in the subsections of section 4.
2.

Reforms Suggested

The Proposed Code of the Law Reform Commission of Canada provides:
54. Every person is competent and compellable to testify to any matter, except
as provided in this Part or any other Act.
57. In a criminal proceeding, a person who is related to the accused by family or
similar ties is not compellable to be a witness for the prosecution if, having
regard to the nature of the relationship, the probable probative value of the
evidence and the seriousness of the offence charged, the need for a person's
testimony is outweighed by the possible disruption of the relationship or the
harshness of compelling the person to testify.

The existing law, which forbids spouses in criminal cases from testifying

for the prosecution when they wish to testify and which forbids their being
forced to testify in cases other than those enumerated in section 4(2), is
apparently supported on the basis that to do otherwise would endanger the

marital relationship. The word apparently is used advisedly since there does
not appear ever to have been a clear value decision made, but rather, like

so much of the existing evidence law, the rule developed centuries ago'5
under different societal conditions with varying justifications. 14 Whether present society values the marriage relationship more highly than the worth of
convicting the guilty is debatable at the least.

Considering the present inability of the willing spouse to testify for the
prosecution, if the rule is designed to foster stable marriage relationships
generally by the infrequent example of a witness failing to testify against her
spouse, one is bound to wonder respecting its impact. If the rule is meant to
protect the individual relationship, one is hard pressed to justify the state's
intervention when the spouse's own judgment of the worth of the marriage
is such that he or she wishes to testify. It seems preferable to allow the
spouse the freedom of choosing to testify after weighing the competing risks
12 This view was recently approved in the decision of R. v. Lonsdale, supra, note 5.
The Alberta Court of Appeal noted that the Gosselin decision, supra, note 10, disagreed
with the later decision of Leach v. The King, [1912] A.C. 305, which held that where
"competent" appeared in a statute, its meaning was restricted to competency, and therefore did not include compellability. The Supreme Court of Canada, on the other hand,
took the view that they were there simply to construe language of the statute as they
found it and that the plain language of the statute rendered "competent" to include, as
at common law, compellability.
13 See cases cited in Cross, supra, note 4 at 141.
14 Historically, husband and wife were regarded as one person. Consequently, where
the litigant spouse was incompetent to testify because of his or her interest in the outcome, the other spouse was also considered incompetent. Although the scriptural fiction
was later abandoned, the incompetency of a spouse was then justified on the ground
that he or she had an interest in the law suit prosecuted by the other spouse. Incompetency of a party on the ground of interest was later abolished, and the present
rationale put forward.
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in the individual case and the Proposed Federal Code's complete abolition of
incompetency in this area is obviously a desired reform.
With respect to the compellability of spouses it is difficult to argue with
the Proposed Federal Code's explanatory remarks that the present law is
arbitrary. The present list of offences in section 4(2) for which the spouse is
compellable for the prosecution is largely a list of sexual offences and one
wonders if this is based on some belief that a marriage relationship is automatically not worth protecting when a spouse commits a sexual offence with
another. Would society agree that a wife ought to be compelled to testify
against her husband who has allegedly raped their next door neighbour but
that she cannot testify if he allegedly murdered the neighbour? There is arbitrariness in the fact that while a marriage relationship ought to be protected, the other familial relationships are not as deserving. The existing law
is arbitrary as well in the type of marriage relationship which will be protected.1 5 The Proposed Federal Code eliminates arbitrariness and substitutes
for it flexibility on a grand scale. The trial judge in each case will decide the
worth of the particular relationship and will decide in advance the probable
worth of the testimony. The Federal Code also states that the trial judge must
consider the seriousness of the offence; however, it does not state whether
the more serious the offence the more probable it is that the evidence will be
received or vice versa.
The present procedural rules do not reflect a desirable balance between
the goals of efficiency and of fairness to the parties. The elimination of the
present rules' arbitrariness is to be applauded since there appears to be little
to justify it. However, in an attempt to balance efficiency and fairness the
proposed reform has gone too far and has done so needlessly. One must have
regard to the frequency with which objections will be taken under the proposed rule with respect to the ability of the individual witness to testify. The
Proposed Federal Code speaks of the lack of compellability in relation to
other individuals who are related by "family or similar ties," yet the Code
does not state what individuals might be encompassed within that phrase.
The time required to deal adequately with these matters on a voir dire will
be enormous. The prospective frequency of appeals on individual opinions
of worth is staggering. If the marriage relationship is fundamentally a keystone of society it appears that the law-makers might then decide that question and always rule that spouses shall not be compellable witnesses for the
prosecution. If society's interest in convicting the guilty is greater than the
worth of individual marriage relationships, they can rule spouses compellable.
The law-makers can also decide on an applicable definition of marriage and
whether other members of the family ought to be made compellable or not.
It appears preferable that those questions be decided at one time for all cases
in preference to individual decisions by a variety of judges each with their
own views.
The Ontario Report concludes that the existing legislation 0 making
15
1

See, for example, Ex parte Cote (1971), 5 C.C.C. (2d) 49.
6 Supra, note 6, s. 8.
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parties and their spouses competent and compellable is largely satisfactory. 17
They do recommend, however, the abolition of the existing provision 8 respecting proceedings instituted in consequence of adultery both to clarify the
existing law and to delete the archaic concept of a privilege against selfincrimination as to adultery. The Ontario Draft Act provides:
9(1) The parties to a proceeding and the persons on whose behalf it is brought,

instituted, opposed or defended are competent and compellable to give evidence on behalf of themselves or of any of the parties, and the spouses of
such parties and persons are competent and compellable to give evidence on
behalf of any of the parties.
(2) The parties to and witnesses in a proceeding instituted in consequence of
adultery and the spouses of such parties may be asked and shall not be
excused from answering any question, including any question tending to
show that he or she has committed adultery.

The approach of the Ontario Law Reform Commission to the existing
sections 6 and 7 of The Evidence Act is intriguing. Those sections provide:
6. No person offered as a witness in an action shall be excluded from giving
evidence by reason of any alleged incapacity from crime or interest.
7. Every person offered as a witness shall be admitted to give evidence notwithstanding that he has an interest in the matter in question or in the event of the
action and notwithstanding that he has been previously convicted of a crime
or offence.

The Report suggests that these sections, one phrased in exclusionary terms
and the other in inclusionary terms, mean the same thing but concludes that
"[a]lthough the sections may overlap, they have been part of our law for a
long time and we are not convinced that any change of consequence should
be made in them."'19 This appears to be a novel approach to be taken by a
commission charged with the task of reform.
C.
1.

MENTAL CAPACITY OF WITNESSES
Existing Law

"As to the mental qualities of intelligence and memory, a distinction
must be made between attacks on competency and attacks on credibility." 20
The preliminary question of the competency of a person to testify is a question that the judge must determine and the issue of credibility of any witness
17 If there has been no evidence of excessive harm to marital relationships as a
result of the longstanding rule that spouses are competent and compellable, at the instance of the opposing party, in civil suits and prosecutions for provincial offences, one
might reasonably argue that the law-makers could so provide for federal criminal cases.
18 Supra, note 6, s. 10 provides:
The parties to a proceeding instituted in consequence of adultery and the husbands
and wives of such parties are competent to give evidence in such proceedings, but
no witness in any such proceeding, whether a party to the suit or not, is liable to
be asked or bound to answer any question tending to show that he or she is guilty
of adultery, unless such witness has already given evidence in the same proceeding
in disproof of his or her alleged adultery.
19 Supra, note 2 at 107.
20 E. Cleary et al., ed., McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence (2d ed.
St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1972) at 93.
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is for the jury.21 The competency of a witness may refer to the person's
ability to observe, recollect and communicate respecting a past incident or
it may refer to the person's ability to take an oath.22 The person's incompetency in the latter case, which formerly23 would have barred him from
testifying, has now been relieved somewhat by statute24 and such a person
may now affirm. When incompetency in the former sense is put in issue,2 5
however, the trial judge is required to make a determination of that issue on
the basis of evidence led on a voir dire. To be rendered incompetent, the
person's derangement or defect must substantially negative trustworthiness
upon the specific subject of the testimony. Present insanity need not be a
26
complete bar.
2.

Reforms Suggested
The Report of the Ontario Law Reform Commission concludes 27 that

the existing law is satisfactory and that no statutory provisions are required.
The Proposed Federal Code, section 54, appears to recommend that mental
maturity be abolished as a requirement to testify with any defects in capacity
left to the trier of fact to take into account when assessing the weight to be

given to the testimony. The reform is proposed on the basis of the "impossibility of stating and applying a standard of mental immaturity." 2 8

21

R. v. Hill (1851), 5 Cox CC.. 259 at 266; 169 E.R. 495 at 498 per Lord
Campbell C.J. See also s. 7(1) of the Proposed Federal Code, supra, note 3.
22 "If at that stage of the trial . . .the judge had had the benefit of hearing the
psychiatrists' testimony ... he would have been in a better position to appreciate that
the issue before him was one which went to the competency of the witness to testify
and was not limited to the issue as to whether the witness should be sworn as distinct
from affirmed." R. v. Hawke (1975), 7 O.R. (2d) 145 at 155; 29 C.R.N.S. 1 at 13; 22
C.C.C. (2d) 19 at 28.
2
3R. v. Brasier (1779), 1 Le. 199; 168 E.R. 202.
24
Supra, note 8, s. 14. Of course, the witness should not give his evidence by affirmation unless the incompetency to take an oath is made out: R. v. Hawke, supra, note
22 at 156 (O.R.); 14 (C.R.N.S.); 30 (C.C.C.).
25
The capacity of an adult witness is presumed until an objection is raised; see
J. Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 2 (3d ed. Boston: Little, Brown, 1940)
s. 497.
26
See R. v. Hill, supra, note 21; see also Wigmore, id. Section 497 is quoted with
approval in R. v. Hawke, supra, note 22 at 154 (O.R.); 11 (C.R.N.S.); 27 (C.C.C.).
First, the mere fact of derangement or defect does not in itself exclude the
witness; the various forms of monomania are no longer treated as equivalent to
complete lunacy;
Secondly, the inquiry is always as to the relation of the derangement or defect
to the subject to be testified about. If on this subject no aberration appears, the
person is acceptable, however untrustworthy on other subjects;
Thirdly, the mere fact of soundness at the time of trial is no longer sufficient;
for derangement or defect at the time of the events to be testified to may make
the person untrustworthy. The inquiry looks to the capacity to observe as well as
to the other elements, the capacity to recollect and to narrate.
Wigmore, supra, note 25, s. 492.
27
Supra, note 2 at 108.
28 See the Commission's commentary on s. 54 of the Proposed Federal Code, supra,
note 3 at 88.
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Others29 as well have suggested that the existing rule which excludes the witness entirely, based on judicial distrust of the jury's ability to adequately
assess deficiencies, is too primitive and that, given appropriate cautionary
instructions and the opportunity of hearing evidence themselves of the witness' frailties, the jury would be equal to the task.
Whether the Proposed Federal Code has accomplished its aim by the
language it has chosen is debatable.3 0 Section 54 states that all persons are
competent except as provided in Part 2 of Title V of the Code. The only
persons rendered incompetent by that Part are the judge and members of the
jury at that trial. Section 7 of Title I of the Code provides that the judge shall
determine, among other things, the preliminary question of the competency
of a person to be a witness. What is there to determine if incompetency is
restricted as above? Does section 7 preserve the ability to exclude entirely a
mentally defective person as a witness? Does section 5 equip a trial judge
with the power to exclude? Section 5 provides:
Evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of undue prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, or undue
consumption of time.

Dean Wigmore notes:
If it is desired to express the doctrine of testimonial qualifications in terms of
relevance it may be thus stated: the fact that an assertion is made by a person
who is sane, of age, experienced in the subject matter, acquainted with the circumstances and so forth, is relevant to show the truth of the facts asserted.31

The large discretion granted the trial judge in section 5, to which all other
rules in the Proposed Federal Code are evidently subject, permits exclusion
when probative value is substantially outweighed by, inter alia, the danger of
undue prejudice or undue consumption of time. As Professor McCormick has
noted: "The traditionaltest is whether the witness has intelligence enough to
make it worthwhile to hear him at all." 32 Despite the avowed object of the
drafters of the Proposed Federal Code, could not a trial judge be persuaded
to exercise his discretion under section 5 and exclude a person's evidence
entirely?
The drafters say they are abolishing the concept because it is impossible
to state and apply a standard. That it is possible to state is evidentas and
while it may be difficult to apply,3 4 it is no less possible than other preliminary questions given to the trial judge by section 7 of the Proposed Code. To
say that "the trend has been to reduce these [earlier] disqualifications . .. "3
with respect to competency is not a valid argument for eliminating them all.
29

See, for example, McCormick, supra, note 20 at 141.
0 A slight quibble perhaps, but mental incapacity might be a better choice than
mental immaturity in this context.
31
Wigmore, supra,note 25, s. 475. Emphasis added.
32
McCormick, supra,note 20 at 140.
33 The Ontario Report, supra, note 2 at 108 cites those provisions in the evidence
codes of Scotland and of California that attempt to define competence.
34
S upra,note 22.
35
Supra,note 3 at 88.
3
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Given the gradual judicial development of the existing law over a lengthy
period of time, an onus lies on the reformer to justify the change and the
brief arguments advanced by the Commission are not convincing.8"
D. CREDIBILITY
1. Adverse and Hostile Witnesses
(a) Existing Law
If the witness has been called by the opposing party, it is obvious that
cross-examination with respect to a prior inconsistent statement or at large
is presently permissible. The procedure for cross-examination on the previous
statement as outlined in section 10 of the Canada Evidence Act 7 is designed
to alleviate those difficulties both for the cross-examiner and for the witness
that the common law had produced.38 By this procedure the witness may
be cross-examined respecting an earlier statement without being shown the
same, but prior to proving the statement the witness must be given an opportunity of explaining any apparent contradiction. The ability of a party to
cross-examine his own witness at large is restricted by the common law and
depends on a ruling of hostility which is normally restricted to hostility revealed in the witness box. 9 The ability of a party who has called a witness
to prove a prior inconsistent statement is restricted by the provisions of section 9 of the CanadaEvidence Act. Section 9(1) permits the proof of a prior
inconsistent statement as a means of discrediting counsel's own witness provided that the witness proves adverse and provided that the court grants its
leave. While the section seems simply to permit proof of the prior statement,
it is apparently accepted that if proof is permitted the witness may also be
cross-examined with respect to it. This right to cross-examine a party's own
witness on a previous statement is apparently derived from the common
law.40 It was recognized in Wawanesa Mutual InsuranceCompany v. Hanes'
86 To be fair, however, it should be noted that over a hundred years ago, the
Report of the Common Law Practice Commissioners similarly proposed:
Plain sense and reason would obviously suggest that any living witness who could
throw light upon a fact in issue should be heard to state what he knows subject
always to observations as may arise as to his means of knowledge or his disposition to tell the truth.
As cited in Wigmore, supra, note 25, s. 510.
37 Section 10 has been copied from England's The Criminal Procedure Act, 1865,
28 & 29 Vict., c. 18, s. 5.
38 Professor Wigmore described the common law rule as a rule which "for unsoundness of principle, impropriety of policy, and practical inconvenience in trials, committed
the most notable mistake that can be found among the rulings upon the present subject."
Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 4 (3d ed. Boston: Little, Brown, 1940), s. 1259.
See Cross, supra, note 4 at 213-15 for a thorough discussion of why the common
law rule was changed. The only present difficulty in this area resides in the interpretation
of the provincial court judge in British Columbia in R. v. Harbison, [1972] 6 W.W.R.
501; 20 C.R.N.S. 336; 9 C.C.C. (2d) 259.
39 See cases collected in P. K. McWilliams, Canadian Criminal Evidence (Agincourt: Canada Law Book, 1974) at 612-14. But see R. v. Gushue (No. 4) (1975), 30
C.R.N.S. 178.
40
McWilliams, id. at 608.
41 [1961] O.R. 495; 28 D.L.R. (2d) 386; [1963] 1 C.C.C. 176
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that while the section only permits proof of the statement,4 cross-examination thereon is permitted on a declaration of adversity and MacKay J.A. noted:
This decision [R. v. Hunter, [1956] V.L.R. 31] points up the difficulty or result of
treating the word 'adverse' in the statute as meaning 'hostile' because unquestionably if the witness is 'hostile' the common law rule applies and he is subject to a
general cross-examination as to all matters in issue; whereas, under the statute,
if he is adverse, the only right given is to prove the prior inconsistent statement
and cross-examination should be limited to the prior inconsistent statement only.43

The meaning of adverse within the section has produced some controversy
since the traditional view had been to equate adverse with hostility of demeanour and the manner in which the witness gives his evidence is therefore
all important.44 The majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal in the Wawanesa case recognized that this was the prevailing view but decided that the
same word in The Evidence Act counterpart of section 9 should be given a
broader interpretation, to include not only hostility but also opposed in
interest to the party calling him. The court went on to conclude that evidence
of a prior inconsistent statement could be taken into account in determining
adversity. 4" Despite the seeming circularity of such a position, I suggest that
a similar position now exists in the trial of federal cases by virtue of subsection 9(2). I recognize that some believe that subsection 9(2) is a new procedure for discrediting a witness, completely independent of subsection 9(1),
but I suggest it is merely a preliminary device to enable counsel to demonstrate the adversity mentioned in 9 (1). With adversity established, the court
might then permit proof of the prior statement and cross-examination thereon in the presence of the trier of fact. If my suggestion is correct, then despite
R. v. Milgaard,46 the cross-examination mentioned in subsection 9(2) ought
to take place on a voir dire. If the trial judge, on witnessing the cross-examination, concludes that the witness is adverse, the party may be granted leave
to prove the statement in the trial, in front of the jury if there is one, and
to cross-examine thereon. The Milgaardcase decided that the cross-examination mentioned in subsection 9(2) ought to take place in the presence of the
jury. With the greatest respect, to permit this would make subsection 9(1)
largely redundant as counsel would thereby normally accomplish what he
seeks without the necessity for any ruling of adversity. Subsection 9(1) would
only have utility then in cases involving oral statements not reduced to writing. I do not believe that this was the intention of Parliament. This view is
reinforced by the concluding words of section 9 (2) that "the court may con42 1d. at 528 (O.R.); 419 (D.L.R.); 215 (C.C.C.).
43

1d. at 532 (O.R.); 423 (D.L.R.); 220 (C.C.C.). See also id. at 534-35 (O.R.);

425-26 (D.L.R.); 223-25 (C.C.C.); and R. v. Brown, [1927] 4 D.L.R. 779. But see R.
v. Cronshaw and Dupon, unreported, 1976 (Langdon J., Provincial Court of Ontario).
44

45

See, for example, R. v. McIntyre (1963), 43 C.R. 262; [1963] 2 C.C.C. 38.

See R. v. Collerman (1964), 46 W.W.R. 300; 43 C.R. 118; [1964] 3 C.C.C. 195,
taking a similar position in a criminal case. In R. v. Gushue (No. 4), supra, note 39 at
183, Graburn Co. Ct. J.states that "adverse" in section 9(1) is not limited to hostility
but rather means "opposed in interest or unfavourable in the sense of opposite in position .. ."
40 [1971] 2 W.W.R. 266; 14 C.R.N.S. 34; 2 C.C.C. (2d) 206. Also see R. v. Tom,

[1976] 3 W.W.R. 391.
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sider such cross-examination in determining whether in the opinion of the
court the witness is adverse."
The remarks of the then Minister of Justice, Mr. Turner, and the then
Director of the Criminal Law Section, Mr. Scollin, when they appeared before the Standing Committee for Justice and Legal Affairs to defend their
proposed bill which amended section 9 of the CanadaEvidence Act by adding
subsection (2) in 1969, are helpful in ascertaining Parliament's intention.
Mr. Turner: Mr. Chairman, section 9 of the present Canada Evidence Act prohibits a party producing a witness from impeaching the credit of that witness
unless in the opinion of the court the witness proves to be adverse or hostile; and
for the purposes of establishing that a witness that a party calls is adverse or hostile, that witness cannot at the moment be cross-examined on any previous inconsistent statement made by him.
Therefore, it is proposed to add a new subsection (2) to section 9 of the Act,
whereby it will be possible, with leave of the court but without establishing first
that a witness is adverse, to cross-examination one's own witness on any previous
inconsistent statement that has been reduced to writing.
And the court may consider such cross-examination in determining whether
in fact the witness is adverse or hostile.
In other words, the court will still be able to weigh the demeanour of the
witness, or the attitude of the witness, or the bearing of the witness, but it will
also now be able to refer to this cross-examine on a previous inconsistent statement reduced to writing.
The proposed amendment relates not only to statements made in writing by
the witness, or signed by him, but also to statements made by the witness and
reduced to writing by some other person - a stenographic record.
Representations in support of this proposed amendment have been received
from the Manitoba and Saskatchewan association of the Canadian Bar Association. In addition, the following resolution was passed by The Canadian Bar Association at its annual meeting on September 9, 1967:
WHEREAS there appear to be conflicting decisions as to whether a party
may put to his witness a prior inconsistent statement until after a ruling of adverseness has been made by the Court; RESOLVED: that Section 9 of the Canada
Evidence Act be amended to provide (a) that by leave of the Court a party might
cross-examine his witness as to prior inconsistent written statements before a finding of adverseness; (b) that such examination might be used by the Court in
determining whether a witness is adverse.47

Mr. Scollin noted that the restriction to written statements was deliberate
and explained:
Mr. Scollin: It was felt that the impeaching of your own witness should be
restricted to written statements, or statements reduced to writing, for much the
same reasons as those advanced in an appeal to the Judicial Council of the State
of New York. It was felt that if one were going to extend the right to prove
inconsistent statements to oral statements, the evidence is relatively easily manufactured; that on the question of proof of adversity by restricting the means of
proving adversity to written or oral statements reduced to wording [sic], then there
was a kind of guarantee that there was something in writing.
The feeling was that if you were going to prove previous inconsistent oral
statements, what could possibly happen would be that the party producing the

47Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 6, Standing Committee on Justice and
Legal Affairs, Tuesday Jan. 28, 1969 at 109-10 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969).
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witness would, when the witness did not quite come up to his proof, call a halt
to the trial and adduce a series of five or six people to say: "Oh, yes; I was in
the bar or the saloon when I heard so-and-so say this," and then would produce
another oral statement allegedly contradictory. This would result in a rather confused situation relative to previous oral statements. Whereas, if you have your
firm base for saying
statement in writing, or reduced to writing, you have a fairly
48
to the court, "Here is what he said. Here it is in writing."
It is interesting also to note that whereas Milgaard requires production of the earlier statement to the trial judge so that he might determine
whether in fact there is an inconsistency prior to cross-examination occurring,
such a procedure was perhaps not present in the minds of the drafters as
noted by the following exchange from the minutes of the Justice and Legal
Affairs Committee:
Mr. McQuaid: Mr. Chairman, I agree with the general purpose of the section, but is enough protection being afforded here to the witness? It says "Where
the party producing a witness alleges that the witness made . . . a statement".
Should not some provision be put in there requiring more than an allegation?
After all, this is a statement in writing. Should there not be a requirement that
the statement be produced?
Mr. Hogarth: It is.
Mr. McQuaid: It does not say so, does it?
Mr. Hogarth: How could one cross-examine on the statement if one did not
have it?
Mr. McQuaid: All you have to do is allege that he made a statement and
then cross-examine him on whether or not he made it. First of all, I think that
the statement should be required to be produced in evidence; you have then
established that he has made the statement in writing. I consider it rather dangerous just to allow that assumption to be made - to allege that he made the
statement, to go no further and then say, "Now we want permission to crossexamine him".
Mr. Turner: Mr. McQuaid, perhaps I should ask Mr. Scollin to refer to section 10 of the Act. It might clarify the point.
Mr. Scollin: Section 10 and 11 are both relevant. Section 10, subsection
clause (1) states:
Upon any trial a witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements
made by him in writing, or reduced to writing, relative to the subject-matter of the
case, without such writing being shown to him; but, if it is intended to contradict
the witness by the writing, his attention must, before such contradictory proof
can be given, be called to those parts of the writing that are to be used for the
purpose of so contradicting him; the judge, at any time during the trial, may
require the production of the writing for his inspection, and there upon make such
use of it for the purpose of the trial as he thinks fit.
49
Mr. McQuaid: That takes care of it, Mr. Scollin.

If section 10 is an answer to Mr. McQuaid's concern, one should keep
in mind the closing words of section 10 and it might be preferable on the
section 9(2) application for the judge to require, along with the allegation
of the prior inconsistent statement, the production of the same so that he
might ensure the validity of the allegation.
(b) Reforms Suggested
The above area has been dealt with at some length to illustrate the exist48 ld.at 112.
49 Id. at 110-11.
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ing confusion generated by an overly technical approach. It is accepted that
there are dangers involved in permitting the cross-examination of a party's
own witness. The witness may all too readily adopt the suggestions contained
in leading questions put to him and the evidence gained may not be that of
the witness but of the counsel putting the questions. It is also recognized that,
in some instances, it may be unfair to call a witness and then to attack that
witness' general character when his testimony is at odds with what counsel
expected. 50 Whether it is unfair or improper to put to a witness a previous
inconsistent statement and cross-examine thereon when that witness has led
counsel to believe he will testify in a certain way is, however, questionable.
Given that these thoughts are at the root of the existing rules, it is regrettable that the present law is so difficult to state clearly. The proposals of the
Commission are stated in terms of their underlying rationale and will be a
welcome relief if enacted. Section 59 of the Proposed Federal Code states
rather simply:
(1) A party calling a witness shall not ask him leading questions unless they
relate to introductory or undisputed matters or are necessary to elicit the
testimony of the witness, or unless it becomes apparent that the witness
desires to give only such answers as he believes will be damaging to the
party's case.
(2) A party who is examining a witness called by another party may ask him
leading questions unless it becomes apparent that the witness desires to give
only such answers as he believes will help the case of the party asking the
questions.
(3) "Leading question" means a question that suggests the answer the examining
party desires.51

Section 59(1) restates the existing law with some liberation from the
present constraints. Rather than requiring decisions on hostility or adversity
as a pre-condition to leading questions, the proposed rule permits leading
questions when the inherent danger seems non-existent. Subsection 59(2)
changes the existing law but the logic of the change seems inescapable. If we
wish to guard against receiving the evidence of counsel by means of his leading questions, then does it matter that the witness who is ready to accede to
counsel's suggestions was called by the other party? It has been expressed
that a party who calls a reluctant witness is thereby permanently saddled
with him; the fact that opposing counsel has the right to cross-examine a
witness who favours his side is simply part of the game and part of the
chance that counsel takes. This view, besides aggravating the attitude that a
trial is a game, minimies its truthseeking ability and contradicts the usual
expression that there is no property in a witness. The Ontario Report contains no recommendations for change in this area.
50 It must be recognized, however, that witnesses called by a party are not called
simply as compurgators but rather may be called because they are simply the only
witnesses available.
51 For the ultimate in simplicity, however, see the formulation in (1958) Ala. Code
tit. 7, s. 444: "Leading questions are generally allowed in cross-examinations, and only
in these; but the court may exercise a discretion in granting the right to the party calling
the witness, and in refusing it to the opposite party, when from the conduct of the witness or other reason, justice requires it."
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Section 62 of the Proposed Federal Code states:
Any party, including the party calling him, may examine a witness and introduce

other relevant evidence for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility,
except as otherwise provided in this Code.

Section 62 provides then, inter alia, that the party calling a witness may
prove a prior inconsistent statement with no restrictions respecting a declaration of adversity prior thereto. The elimination of that restriction on proof of
a prior inconsistent statement is to be admired. The Proposed Federal Code,
section 66, retains the existing restrictions on proof. The existing law, which
demands that prior to proving a prior inconsistent statement the circumstances surrounding the making of the same, or at least the writing itself,
must be brought to the attention of the witness who will be thereby contradicted, provides, in fairness to the witness, an opportunity to explain.
Section 24 of the Ontario Draft Act provides:
(1) A party producing a witness in a proceeding shall not impeach his credit by
general evidence of bad character, but he may contradict him by other evidence, or proof that the witness at some time made a statement inconsistent
with his present evidence.
(2) Before proof of a prior inconsistent statement is given in a proceeding the
circumstances of it sufficient to designate the particular occasion on which
it was made shall be drawn to the attention of the witness and he shall be
asked whether or not he made the statement.
(3) No such prior statement is admissible in evidence in a proceeding to prove
any fact contained in it.

The Ontario proposal then similarly provides that no restrictions be placed
on the right of a party to prove a previous inconsistent statement of his own
witness and also retains the requirement of providing the witness with the
opportunity of admitting or denying the previous statement.
Section 65 of the Proposed Federal Code provides:
In examining a witness concerning a statement made by him on a previous occasion, the statement need not be disclosed to him except as required by the Judge.

This section preserves the existing law52 that permits cross-examination of a
witness on a prior inconsistent statement without first showing such writing
to the witness. Preservation of the existing law in this area is appreciated in
that counsel's ability to cross-examine a witness on a prior inconsistent statement could be severely crippled if he was commanded to show the statement
to the witness before asking him questions about it.
Sections 27 and 28 of the Proposed Federal Code provide:
27(1) Hearsay evidence is inadmissible except as provided in this Code or any
other Act.
(2) In this Code
(a) "hearsay" means a statement, other than one made by a person while
testifying at a proceeding, that is offered in evidence to prove the truth of

the statement; and
(b) "statement" means an oral or written assertion or non-verbal conduct
of a person intended by him as an assertion.
62 Supra, note

8, s. 10.
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A statement previously made by a witness is not excluded by section 27
if the statement would be admissible if made by him while testifying as a
witness.

By the existing law, a witness' prior statement, whether consistent or inconsistent with his present testimony, is, when received,6 only evidence affecting

the witness' credibility." The prior statement was not made under oath and
was not subject to immediate cross-examination and is presently viewed as
inadmissible hearsay if tendered as evidence of its truth. When the prior

statement is consistent with present testimony and is received in support of
credibility, the distinction between such use and use as evidence of truth may

be negligible in practice. The Proposed Federal Code's change in section 28
giving the statement evidential value for its truth probably only brings theory
into line with practice.

With respect to prior inconsistent statements, however, the change made
by section 28 may be profound. The proposed change seems based on the
belief that since both the witness' present testimony and his earlier statement

are subject to the same test of cross-examination, they therefore ought to be
received equally as substantive evidence. The Report's proposal appears to
be based on the thought that while the efficacy of cross-examination is some-

what impaired when it does not immediately follow the making of the statement, the prior statement does bring with it the possibility of greater accuracy since it was made when the event testified to was fresher in memory and

prior to the influence of parties or subsequent events. The proposal does not,
however, take into account the difficulty counsel might have at trial crossexamining a witness respecting his ability to perceive and recollect an event
when the witness is denying its truth; counsel cannot cross-examine a piece
of paper. For example, suppose the witness denies making an earlier statement to the police that he saw the accused shoot and kill the victim and

53 We have seen above the restrictions on proof of a prior consistent statement.
Prior consistent statements are normally rejected as superfluous (Wigmore, supra, note
38, s. 1124) although it is sometimes said that they are inadmissible because of the
danger that a witness might manufacture evidence for himself. Its superfluity is diminished if there is an attack on credibility by an allegation in cross-examination that the
witness has recently invented his story or that his evidence is an afterthought concerning the event. The initial common law position was very strict: Fox v. General Medical
Council, [1960] W.L.R. 1017; Welstead v. Brown, [1952] 1 S.C.R. 3; [1952] 1 D.L.R.
465; 102 C.C.C. 46 demanded that, prior to receiving the prior statement, the direct
accusation of fabrication be put to the witness. More recent cases, however, illustrate a
growing latitude in the area. See R. v. Rosik, [1971] 2 O.R. 47; 13 C.R.N.S. 129; 2
C.C.C. (2d) 351; and R. v. Lalonde, [1972] 1 O.R. 376 at 389; 15 C.R.N.S. 1 at 14;
5 C.C.C. (2d) 168 at 180-81. There are other areas in which prior inconsistent statements may be received; complaints of victims who have suffered a sexual, or other
violent attack (see, for example, R. v. Lebrun, [1951] O.R. 387; 12 C.R. 31; 100 C.C.C.
16); earlier identifications of the accused (as in R. v. Sutton, [1970] 2 O.R. 358; 9
C.R.N.S. 45; [1970] 3 C.C.C. 152); and earlier exculpatory statements by an accused
charged with possession of stolen goods (see, for example, R. v. Graham, [1974] 3
S.C.R. 206; 26 D.L.R. (3d) 579; [1972] 4 W.W.R. 488; 19 C.R.N.S. 117; 7 C.C.C.
(2d) 93). These restrictions are eliminated by the Proposed Federal Code, s. 62, but
a trial judge may of course exercise his discretion under the proposed s. 5 to reject
superfluous evidence.
5
4 See, for example, Welstead v. Brown, id.
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denies any knowledge of the incident. The prior statement is proved to have
been made and the jury is then instructed that they are entitled to accept that
statement as proof that the accused killed the victim notwithstanding the
impossibility of cross-examination respecting its accuracy. The accused cannot cross-examine the witness respecting the lighting conditions at the time
of the killing, the amount of time the witness had to observe the event, the
chief physical characteristics of the person observed that caused him to say
it was the accused and so on.
The recommendations of the Ontario Law Reform Commission are
puzzling to say the least. Section 28 of the Draft Act provides:
(1) A previous consistent statement made by a witness in a proceeding is admissible in evidence to rebut an allegation that his evidence has been fabricated, and such a statement shall be admitted not only to support the credibility of that witness, but also as evidence of any fact contained therein of
which direct oral evidence by him would be admissible.
(2) Where corroboration is required by law, a statement admitted under this
section shall not be taken as corroborative of the evidence of the witness who
made the statement.

This section renders previous consistent statements evidence of the truth of
the matter stated and, as suggested above, no real change is thereby effected.
Section 24 of the Draft Act states:
(1) A party producing a witness in a proceeding shall not impeach his credit by
general evidence of bad character, but he may contradict him by other evidence or proof that the witness at some other time made a statement inconsistent with his present evidence.
(2) Before proof of a prior inconsistent statement is given in a proceeding, the
circumstances of it sufficient to designate the particular occasion on which it
was made shall be drawn to the attention of the witness and he shall be asked
whether or not he made the statement.
(3) No such prior statement is admissible in evidence in proceedings to prove any
fact contained in it.

The Ontario Report itself states:
We have concluded that it would not be wise to permit counsel calling a witness
to adduce evidence of a prior statement inconsistent with the evidence given by the
witness at the trial, as proof of the facts contained in the statement. In our view,
proof of such a statement should be permitted only for the purpose of discrediting
a witness who has disappointed an examiner. To admit a prior statement as evidence of the facts contained therein, would permit a statement not given under
oath to contradict the evidence of the maker of the statement which has been
given under oath.55 (Emphasis added.)

However, the Draft Act provides:
34(1) If in a proceeding a witness upon cross-examination as to a former statement made by him relative to the matter in question and inconsistent with
his present testimony does not distinctly admit that he did make such
statement, proof may be given that he did in fact make it, but before such
proof is given the circumstances of the supposed statement sufficient to
designate the particular occasion shall be mentioned to the witness, and he
shall be asked whether or not he did make such statement.
(2) Where under this section it is proved that a witness made a statement
5 Supra, note 2 at 53.
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inconsistent with his present testimony, the statement shall be admitted as
evidence of the facts stated therein but only if the witness could have testified as to such facts.

The recommended legislation, section 24, indicates a reluctance to permit a
party who calls a witness to gain substantive value from any prior statement
when that witness fails to come up to his prior proof. If that witness, however, proves to be hostile and therefore subject to cross-examination, such
value can be achieved by section 34. Section 24 removes any requirement of
adversity or hostility for the proof of a prior inconsistent statement but imposes such a requirement before the statement can have any value over and
above impeaching the witness. Why this solution is adopted is unexplained,
though it seems to be based on an abortive attempt at adopting the English
position. 56 The Ontario recommendation grants substantive value to the
previous inconsistent statement, though elicited from a witness called by the
party who proves the statement, if, but only if, the statement is proved after
cross-examination of that witness by that party. The English took the position that proof was subject to the trial judge's discretion and believed that
such discretion would not be exercised in those cases where the witness
simply did not come up to his prior proof. 57 The Ontario recommendation,
however, provides for proof without leave in section 24 of the Draft Act.
There is some judicial authority5" that hostility, which permits cross-examination at large, can be found to exist when the witness is opposed in interest
as evidenced by a prior inconsistent statement. It is questionable, therefore,
whether the Ontario recommendation accomplishes what it set out to do.
2. Past Characterof a Witness
(a) Existing Law
It has long been recognized that evidence of the past character of a
witness may be relevant to his present credibility. It is generally assumed
that, though relevant, it may be superfluous if offered to support credibility
when there has not been any attack on the credibility of the witness." When
offered to attack credibility, or to support credibility after an attack has been
made, the manner of its proof is circumscribed.
(i) Contradictinga Witness on CollateralFacts
A witness during cross-examination may be led into the position of contradicting his earlier testimony and so his credibility may be affected. The
56 A

problem in drafting also appears:
Where on cross-examination a witness admits making a statement inconsistent
with his present testimony, or where he does not admit making a statement inconsistent with his present testimony and proof is given that he did in fact make such
a statement the statement should be received as evidence of the facts stated there-

in.
Id. at 55. The amendment suggested, however, seems to confine substantive value
to statements proved "under this section," and the legislation produces a result obviously
not in accord with the intentions of the Commission.
57 Thirteenth Report (Hearsay Evidence in Civil Proceedings) (1966; Cmnd. 2964)
at 51-53.
58
R. v. Gushue (No. 4), supra, note 39.
59 Supra, note 20, s. 49.
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scope of cross-examination, of course, is such that the contradiction may be
with respect to evidence which is not relevant to the subject matter of the
case but, nevertheless, the trier of fact may infer that the witness, being shown
to be mistaken or confused on some peripheral point, may also be mistaken in
his evidence on some material point. Given that counsel in cross-examination
is entitled to ask, subject to the trial judge's discretion, all manner of questions which may be relevant to a material issue in the case, what is counsel's
entitlement when a witness denies counsel's suggestion and counsel is in a
position to lead independent evidence to contradict the denial? The present
collateral facts rule precludes the contradiction of a witness' answer by evidence which is irrelevant to any substantive issue.6 0 The cross-examiner must
accept and live with the denial. By the Phipson formulation of the rule, a fact
is collateral if it is not relevant to a substantive issue though exceptions to
the rule exist when the fact illustrates matters such as bias in the witness.6 1
Another formulation of the collateral facts rule, commonly referred to as the
Pollock-Wigmore formulation, is less restrictive of the cross-examiner's
ability and permits contradiction if the fact is relevant to a substantive issue
or is relevant to a testimonial factor of the witness apart from contradiction
simpliciter. Testimonial factors provable to discredit the witness apart from
contradiction, such as bias, interest or lack of opportunity to truly know the
facts to which he has testified, should not be subject to any collateral facts
rule limitation. The rule appears simple and is only difficult when one seeks
to determine what is a "collateral fact." The technical approach often taken
by the courts indicates at times62 a lack of recognition of the purpose of this
rule. The rationale for the limitation on contradiction is not that such contradiction is irrelevant to credibility, but rather that it may produce the dangers of surprise and confusion of issues and may waste time.a6
(ii) Witness' Reputation

Though infrequently done, 64 it is clear that a witness may be called to
impugn another witness' character for veracity. Initially 5 it was necessary to
60

Supra, note 4 at 218-21 for a discussion of the exceptions.

61See M. Argyle et al., ed., Phipson on Evidence (10th ed. London: Sweet &

Maxwell, 1963) ss. 1556-58. But see R. v. Grass (1972), 7 C.C.C. (2d) 122 respecting
contradictions of evidence-in-chief.
6
2 See, for example, Piddington v. Bennett and Wood Pty. (1940), 63 C.L.R. 533.
63 See the remarks of Rolfe B. in The Attorney General v. Hitchcock (1847), 154
E.R. 38 at 44:
If we lived for a thousand years, instead of about sixty or seventy, and every case
were of sufficient importance, it might be possible, and perhaps proper to throw
a light on matters in which every possible question might be suggested, for the
purpose of seeing by such means whether the whole was unfounded, or what portion of it was not, and to raise every possible inquiry as to the truth of the statements made. But I do not see how that could be; in fact, mankind find it to be
impossible. Therefore, some line must be drawn ....
6
4 See Toohey v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, [1965] A.C. 595 at 605-06 per
Lord Pearce; but see R. v. F., [1968] 1 O.R. 658 (sub nom. R. v. Forge); 3 C.R.N.S.
117; [19691
2 C.C.C. 4.
65
Mawson v. Hartsink (1802), 4 Esp. 102; 170 E.R. 656; cited in Toohey, id. at
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ask the witness if he had knowledge of the other witness' reputation for
veracity and whether from that knowledge he would believe the witness on
oath. This, of course, is consistent with the normal rules of leading character
evidence 6 but apparently the rule was later modified to permit the witness to
state simply whether he would believe the oath of the person. 67 The witness
cannot state the reasons for his opinion in chief, nor relate specific instances
of conduct on which the opinion is based, but he may be cross-examined
respecting the same.
(iii)
Opinion of Witness' Credibility
Defects in the capacity of the witness to have actually seen clearly the
incident to which he testifies, or to recall the incident with precision or to
describe the incident to the court is probably the most fertile ground for
examining credibility as these defects are more common than defects in sincerity. The manner in which these defects may be explored is not commonly
a matter of evidence law so much as forensic skill. Nevertheless, in the last
few years, the ability to lead psychiatric evidence on credibility where the
same may be affected by defects in capacity inherent in the witness' mental
condition has been established. Perhaps the landmark case in the area is
Toohey v. The Metropolitan Police Commissioner,6" where the House of
Lords recognized the relevance and admissibility of medical evidence to show
that a witness suffers from some disease or defect of mind that affects the
reliability of his evidence. The House of Lords recognized the logic of such a
position with respect to such evidence by analogizing to the evidence of an
opthalmologist's testimony that a witness' eyesight prevented the witness from
seeing what he said he saw.6
(iv) Witness' PriorActions
In R. v. Racco (No. 4)70 the traditional view was sanctioned that counsel may in cross-examination ask any questions relevant to credibility notwithstanding that he is not in a position to contradict the witness. Crossexamining counsel need not have "reasonable grounds for thinking that the
imputation conveyed by the question is well-founded or true.171 Judge

66 R. v. Rowton (1865), Le. & Ca. 520; 169 E.R. 1497; cited in Toohey, supra,
note 64 at 606.
67
See R. v. Brown and Hedley (1867), 10 Cox C.C. 453; 16 L.T. 364 approving
that form of question; and see R. v. Gunewardene, [1951] 2 K.B. 600 which denied the
ability of medical doctor to express his reasons for his opinion respecting credibility
but seemingly approved a bare opinion.
6
s Toohey, supra, note 64.
69 Other recent examples of such evidence being received may be seen in R. v.
Dietrich, [1970] 3 O.R. 725; 11 C.R.N.S. 22; 1 C.C.C. (2d) 49 and R. v. Phillon, [1973]
2 O.R. 209; 34 D.L.R. (3d) 99; 21 C.R.N.S. 169; 10 C.C.C. (2d) 562. But compare R.
v. Kyselka, [1962] O.W.N. 160; 37 C.R. 391; 133 C.C.C. 103 respecting the offer
of such evidence in support of credibility. The law in this area has been thoroughly
and recently examined in M. Manning and A. W. Mewett, Psychiatric Evidence (197576), 18 Crim. L.Q. 325 at 336-42.
70 (1975), 29 C.R.N.S. 322 per Graburn I.
71 Id. at 324.
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Grabum relied on the Ontario Court of Appeal decision of R. v. Bencardino,2 which in turn quoted from Lord Radcliffe in Fox v. General Medical
Council:
An advocate is entitled to use his discretion as to whether to put questions in the
course of cross-examination which are based on material which he is not in a
position to prove directly. The penalty is that, if he gets a denial or some answer
that does not suit him, the answer stands against him for what it is worth.
That comment was with respect to disciplinary proceedings against a doctor
where the following question and answer occurred: 'Q: Did you seduce her in
surgery very soon after that . .. ? A: I did not.' No evidence was adduced to
prove the asserted seduction.73

The common law earlier provided that a witness might be incompetent
to testify if he had been previously convicted of certain infamous crimes. This
position was later modified by statute in most common law jurisdictions to
permit the witness to testify with his prior conviction left to affect his credibility. For example, section 12 of the existing CanadaEvidence Act permits
counsel to question a witness "as to whether he has been convicted of any
offence."7 4 If the witness denies the fact or refuses to answer counsel may,
as an exception to the collateral facts rule, prove the previous conviction and
so contradict the witness. At one time it was arguable that what was relevant
to the credibility was the observed question and answer and contradiction but
it now appears well-settled that it is the fact of the previous conviction that
is relevant to credibility. Although the witness may be questioned as to prior
convictions even when the witness is the accused, 75 he is given somewhat
greater protection than an ordinary witness. 76 The recent decision of R. v.
Davison, DeRosie and McArthur 77 thoroughly canvasses this area and recognizes the possibility of prejudice to the accused who takes the witness
stand in that the trier of fact may improperly use the prior conviction as
evidence of his propensity to commit like acts, rather than as affecting his
credibility. Mr. Justice Martin noted that such a witness ought not to be
"cross-examined with respect to discreditable conduct and associations" unless the same is "directly relevant to prove the falsity of the accused's evidence." 78 Mr. Justice Martin in the Davison case "clarified" the position of
Mr. Justice Spence in the case of Colpitts v. The Queen,79 which appeared to
suggest that the accused-witness was open to the same sort of cross-examination respecting past conduct as any other witness and quoted with approval
72

(1973), 11 C.C.C. (2d) 549.

73 Fox v. General Medical Council, supra, note 53 at 1023.

74 But note the protection afforded such a witness in England when the accused
was made a competent witness: Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict., c. 36, s.

1(f).
75 R. v. d'Aoust (1902), 3 D.L.R. 653; 5 C.C.C. 407.
76 See A. N. Doob and V. P. Hans, Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act and

the Deliberations of Simulated Juries (1975-76), 18 Crim. L.Q. 235, confirming by experimental data the dangers to an accused-witness which have always been assumed to
exist.
77 (1975), 6 O.R. (2d) 103; 20 C.C.C. (2d) 424.
78 Id.
79

at 444 (e.e.C.) per Martin 1.

[1965] S.C.R. 739; 52 D.L.R. (2d) 416; 47 C.R. 175; [1966] 1

C.e.O. 146.
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from the restrictive remarks of Taschereau J. in Koufis v. The King.80 It is
interesting to note however that in R. v. Boyce,s Mr. Justice Martin holds
that it is proper under section 12 to inquire not only into the fact of conviction but also to inquire with respect to the penalty imposed on the earlier
occasion of that conviction. In R. v. McLaughlan8 2 the court found the
cross-examination of the Crown Attorney to be improper where the Crown
Attorney dealt at some length with the particulars of each of the offences and
the conduct of the accused leading up to his convictions and also with respect
to previous charges on which the accused had been acquitted. The danger to
an accused-witness is enhanced in those jurisdictions where the question put
to the witness embraces within it the details of the past convictions which
show that the accused has committed actions in the past strikingly similar to
the crime alleged.
It may be arguable that under the present law the trial judge has a
discretion to foreclose the questioning mentioned in section 12 when the
witness is the accused. The Supreme Court of Canada8 3 has preserved the
common law discretion to exclude evidence which is of minimum probative
value in comparison to the possibility of prejudice to the accused. By prejudice, of course, is meant the improper use of evidence. While the fact of
a prior conviction has been held to be relevant to credibility in many cases,
the nature of the past offence may limit severely its probative worth. If the
prior conviction is for an offence identical to the offence being tried, the
prejudice may be extremely high. The trier of fact may improperly use the
prior conviction, not for its "tendered" purpose as relevant to credibility,
but for the purpose of inferring that the accused, who has acted badly in the
past, has acted in conformity with his character. That this is an improper use
is, of course, clear from the rules of evidence respecting tendering evidence
of character and the limitations on the introduction of similar fact evidence.
When an accused is on trial for assault and a prosecutor asks him, pursuant
to section 12, if he has been convicted of assault on six occasions within the
past eighteen months, one must wonder about the prosecutor's true purpose
84
and query whether the trial judge ought therefore to exercise his discretion.
It is clear that many accused forfeit their right to testify because they
fear that disclosure of a past record might prejudice them in the mind of the
trier of fact. The stringency of the existing rules respecting the use of character evidence against an accused suggests that we are serious in insisting that
an accused be tried for what he has allegedly done in the charge he presently
80 [1941] S.C.R. 481; [1941] 3 D.L.R. 657; 76 C.C.C. 161.
81 (1975), 23 C.C.C. (2d) 16 at 36-37.

(1974), 20 C.C.C. (2d) 59.
83R. v. Wray, [1971] S.C.R. 272; 11 D.L.R. (3d) 673; 11 C.R.N.S. 235; [1970] 4

82

C.C.C. 1.
84 See R. v. St. Pierre, [1973] 1 O.R. 718; 10 C.C.C. (2d) 164, rev'd on other
grounds (1974), 3 O.R. (2d) 642; 17 C.C.C. (2d) 489. Compare the views of Norris
J.A. in R. v. Leforte (1961), 31 D.L.R. (2d) 1; 36 C.R. 181; 131 C.C.C. 169, and
Kerwin C.J.C. on appeal (1962), 31 D.L.R. (2d) 1. Has Kerwin CJ.C. ruled that there
is no such discretion? Was the English provision relied on by Norris J.A. truly different
from s. 12 of the Canada Evidence Act?
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faces, and not for what it has been proved he has done in the past. The
judicial development of the law surrounding section 12 causes concern respecting our sincerity in that regard.
(b) Reforms Suggested
Section 62 of the Proposed Federal Code states:
Any party, including the party calling him, may examine a witness and introduce
other relevant evidence for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility,
except as otherwise provided in this Code.
This section seeks to abolish, inter alia, the existing collateral facts rule, the
rules presently constraining the types of evidence receivable to support or
attack credibility, and the rule against supporting credibility prior to attack.
In place of these rules it is suggested that all evidence relevant to credibility
is admissible but that the trial judge has a discretion to exercise depending
on the facts of the particular case. Section 63 of the Proposed Federal Code
provides:
Evidence of a trait of a witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness is
inadmissible to attack or support the credibility of the witness unless it is of sub-

stantial probative value.

and section 58(2) of the Proposed Federal Code provides:
The judge shall exercise reasonable control over the presentation of evidence and
the examination of witnesses so as to make them effective for the ascertainment
of the truth, to avoid needless consumption of time, and to protect witnesses from
harassment or undue embarrassment.

Of course, section 5 of the Proposed Federal Code which deals with the
general discretion is always available:
Evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of undue prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, or undue consumption of time.

There is no doubt that the new approach is decidedly more rational than
the existing mechanical application of the rules, which at times are artificial,
but it demands vigilance on the part of the trial judge to protect unrepresented witnesses from undue harassment or embarrassment and to guard
against the great dangers enumerated in section 5. It also requires a practising bar which will exhibit responsibility and restraint. It is only to be hoped
that the quality of personnel within the existing system is equal to the large
task to be created by the proposed change.
With respect to the evidence of past actions of a witness, the Proposed
Federal Code provides in section 64:
(1) Evidence of the conviction of a witness for a crime is inadmissible for the
purpose of attacking his credibility if the witness has been pardoned for the

crime or five years have elapsed from the day of his conviction or release
from confinement for his most recent conviction of a crime, whichever is the
later.
(2) In a criminal proceeding no evidence of the accused's character, including
evidence that he has been convicted of a crime, is admissible for the sole
purpose of attacking his credibility as a witness, unless he has first introduced
evidence admissible solely for the purpose of supporting his credibility.

That there ought to be limitations on the cross-examiner's ability in this
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area is clear. The limitations suggested by the Proposed Federal Code however are anomalous. There is no limitation within section 64 with respect to
the type of activity for which the witness is previously convicted but there is
a time limitation. Section 63, however, denies the possibility of introducing
evidence of a trait of a witness' character for truthfulness "unless it is of
substantial probative value." Presumably section 63 would forbid questions
respecting previous convictions for offences which have no direct connection
with honesty or truthfulness. However, section 64 then has the single effect of
excluding substantially probative evidence when an arbitrary time period has
elapsed. By this section a witness who has perjured himself on the only other
occasions on which he has testified and who has been convicted of the same,
may not be asked about those convictions. In view of the fact that the
Federal Code throughout seems to argue in favour of the admission of evidence, subject to the trial judge's discretion, this arbitrary rule, the effect of
which can only be the exclusion of substantially relevant evidence, seems
strange. It appears odd also that a witness may be asked about previous
conduct substantially relevant to credibility and such conduct may be proved,
but evidence of previous convictions for that very conduct is inadmissible if
barred by time.
Section 64(2) forecloses all evidence attacking the credibility of an
accused who chooses to become a witness unless the accused has led evidence
to support the same. This proposal offers an accused greater protection than
any common law jurisdiction.8 5 An accused-witness who has been convicted
of perjury on any number of occasions and no matter how recently can keep
that evidence from the trier of fact provided that he does not lead evidence
to support his own credibility. Again this arbitrary provision appears odd
when viewed in the midst of a Code that stresses discretion rather than arbitrary rules. One would have expected in this Code to find a provision similar
to that which exists in New South Wales:
When any question put to a witness in cross-examination is not relevant to the
cause or proceeding, except so far as the truth of the matter suggested by the
question affects the credit of the witness by injuring his character, the Court shall
have a discretion to disallow the question, if in its opinion the matter is so remote
in time, or of such a nature that an admission of its truth would not materially
affect the credibility of the witness. 86
8
5 Legislation from a variety of jurisdictions is gathered together in the Ontario Law
Reform Commission's report, supra, note 2 at 194-98. In England, for example, an
accused also loses his protection if his defence involves imputations of the character of
the prosecutor or his witnesses (see Selvey v. D.P.P., [1970] A.C. 304) or if he has given
evidence against another person charged with the same offence: Criminal Evidence Act,
supra,note 74.
86 The Evidence Act, 1898-1973 (No. 11) (N.S.W.) s. 56. The language of this
section suggests a problem with respect to the proposed legislation. It seems clear that
the proposed section 64(2) seeks to foreclose questioning of the accused with respect
to past convictions as well as independent proof of the same. The proposed section may
produce unfortunate litigation as to its meaning as some may interpret it to foreclose
only independent proof and not questioning. To accomplish the intent of the drafters of
the Proposed Federal Code, it may be better to use language such as in that used in the
New South Wales provision, for example: "a person charged and called as a witness in
pursuance of this Act shall not be asked, and if asked shall not be required to answer, ... .
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While section 64(2) gives blanket protection to the accused who does
not lead evidence solely to support credibility, it exposes him to blanket intrusion if he does, and may therefore deny him part of the protection that he
enjoys under the existing law. Section 63 provides him with the protection
that prior actions proved must be substantially relevant, but existing law appears to protect the accused from such questions and proof unless his actions
resulted in convictions. As recently described by Martin J.A.:
[S]ave for cross-examination as to previous convictions permitted by s. 12 of the
Canada Evidence Act, an accused may not be cross-examined with respect to misconduct or discreditable associations unrelated to the charge on which he is being
tried for the purpose of leading to the conclusion that by reason of his bad character he is a person whose evidence ought not to be believed. Cross-examination,
however, which is directly relevant to prove the falsity of the accused's evidence
upon
does not fall within the ban, notwithstanding that it may incidentally reflect
87
the accused's character by disclosing discreditable conduct on his part.

The Ontario Report recommends the repeal of section 23 of The Evidence Act and its replacement with the following:
36(1) A witness in a proceeding shall not be asked any question tending to show
that he has been convicted of any Federal or provincial offence solely for
the purpose of attacking his credibility unless the court finds that the conviction is, because of the nature of the offence and the date of its commission, relevant to the witness' credibility.
(2) Notwithstanding subsection 1, a witness in a proceeding may be asked any
question tending to show that he has been convicted of an offence under
section 121, 122 or 124 of the Criminal Code (Canada).
(3) Notwithstanding subsections 1 and 2, a witness in a proceeding shall not be
asked any question tending to show that he has been convicted of any
offence for which he has been granted a pardon.
(4) Where a witness in a proceeding is asked a question under subsection 1 or
2 and he either denies the allegation or refuses to answer, the conviction
may be proved, and a certificate containing the substance and effect only,
omitting the formal part, of the charge and of the conviction, purporting
to be signed by the officer having the custody of the records of the court
at which the offender was convicted, or by a deputy of the officer, is, upon
proof of the identity of the witness as such convict, sufficient evidence of
the conviction, without proof of the signature or of the official character
of the person appearing to have signed the certificate.

It is interesting that the Ontario recommendation in this area does not make
any distinction between the ordinary witness and the witness who is also the
accused, despite the fact that the Report recognizes that it is the latter who
runs the greater danger. While the ordinary witness may be embarrassed or
unduly harassed, the accused-witness may be improperly convicted of a
serious offence. Nevertheless, the approach taken in subsection 1, placing a
discretion in the trial judge, seems the only appropriate approach and therefore preferable to the position taken by the Law Reform Commission of
Canada. One is intrigued, however, by subsection 2, which appears to exhibit
some distrust of the trial judge in providing that, though the previous offence
is held to be irrelevant to the witness' credibility, nevertheless it may be in87
R. v. Davison, De Rosie and MacArthur, supra, note 77. Leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada was refused December 2, 1974.
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troduced if it was in relation to a perjury charge. The Report itself states
that the Ontario Law Reform Commission believes there must be some connection between the prior conviction and the issue of credibility. That connection presumably must be one of relevance. It seems odd, therefore, to
provide in subsection 2 that notwithstanding a finding of irrelevance the
material should nevertheless be receivable.
E.

CONCLUSION
The preceding material has attempted to illustrate and compare the
approaches taken by the two Commissions with respect to the law of evidence concerning the competency of witnesses. Whichever approach to reform is preferred, it is suggested that no reform at all is better than separate
reforms. If the present system is unduly complex or archaic, at least it is
common to both provincial and federal matters. It is most regrettable that
the reform groups in this country evidently could not cooperate to produce
a united effort. If both approaches become law, there is abundant confusion
ahead for the profession, the judges and the public.

